Introduction
A safety property [9] of a program asserts that some proscribed "bad thing" does not occur during execution.
To prove that a program satisfies a safety property, one typically employs an invariant, a characterization of current (and possibly past) program states that is not invalidated by execution.
If an invariant
I holds in the initial state of the program and I =_ Q is valid for some Q, then -_Q cannot occur during execution. Thus, to establish that a program satisfies the safety property asserting that -,Q does not occur, it suffices to find such an invariant I.
Timing properties are safety properties where the "bad thing" involves the time and program state at the instants that various specified control points in a program become active. 1 Timing properties can concern externally visible events, llke inputs and outputs, as well as events and data that are internal to a program, like the value of a variable or the time that a particular command starts or finishes. For example, in process control applications, the elapsed time between a stimulus and response may have to be bounded. This is a timing property where the "bad thing" is defined in terms of the time that elapses after one control point becomes active until some other control point does. (b) . The presentation is organized as follows.
In Section 2 we describe Proof Outline Logic for non-real-time programs. Then, in Section 3, we describe additional mechanisms needed to handle real time. In particular, we describe changes that must be made to the Rule of Consequence and to the definition of non-interference. In Section 4_ we illustrate the use of our logic on a mutual exclusion protocol. Section 5 contains discussion of related topics.
An appendix summarizes a Plotkin-style [13] structural operational semantics and soundness proof. The full details of the soundness proof will appear in [2] . Our proof builds a natural model, similar to models built by other researchers in the theory of concurrent programming languages [6, 18, 1, 13] . This method of construction argues for the reasonability of the logic and language as well as proving its soundness, in much the same way that, for example, having the integers as a model of an arithmetic system, or the Scott models for a ),-calculus, give more plausibility than a term model does. For each command or atomic action S, we define the following control predicates:
at(S):
an entry control point for S is active.
after(S):
an exit control point from S is active.
in(S):
at(S') holds for some atomic action comprising S.
The various commands of a programming language give rise to a set of axioms relating these control predicates.
These axioms formalize how the control predicates for a command or atomic action S relate to the control predicates for constructs comprising S and constructs containing S, based on the control flow defined by S. For our programming language these axioms are given in Figure 1 . We use GEvaIif (S) there to denote the guard evaluation action for an if with label S and GEvaldo(S) to denote the guard evaluation action for a do with label S. If T is a subprogram of S and some PO(S) is fixed, then we write pre(T) (resp. post(T)) for the assertion(s) that PO(S) associates with at(T) (resp.= aficrtT)); these are called the precondition and postcondition of T. For the proof outline in Figure 2 , this correspondence is summarized in Figure 3 . In it, x is a program variable and X is a rigid variable. 
Here, the entry control point for program x := 1 y := 2, and the entry control point for z := 1 map to the same assertion, P. This is reasonable, because at("x := 1 y := 2") and at("x := 1") are equivalent; if one control point is active, so will be the other. Finally, for a proof outline PO (5,) , we write pre(PO(5')) to denote pre (5,) , post(PO (5,) ) to denote post (5,) , and use a triple {P} PO(5") {Q} to specify the proof outline in which pre (5,) is P,
is Q, and all other pre-and postconditions are the same as in PO (5,) . 
where T ranges over the subprograms of S. For example, the proof outline invariant defined by
PO(S)
of Figure 2 is: In particular, there are some command-independent inference rules as well as an axiom or inference rule for each type of command and atomic action. The command-independent rules appear in Figure 5 . With one minor exception, they will apply in our real-time setting as well. We now turn to the axiomatization for a guarded-command concurrent programming language. The skip command is a single atomic action whose execution has no effect on any program variable.
Thus, it leaves primitive assertions--which only mention program variables and terms that by their nature cannot change---unchanged.
skip Axiom: For a primitive assertion P: {P} skip {P}
The familiar Hoare [7] assignment rule applies:
Rule of Consequence:
Rule of Equivalence: 
Rigid

POA(S), POB(S)
Disjunction Rule:
POA(S) @ POB(S)
denotes the proof outline that associates A_ v B_ with each control predicate cp. 
POA(S), POB(S)
In order to reason about an if command, we must reason about its guard evaluation action as well as the commands it guards.
The following axiom allows us to derive proof outlines for guard evaluation actions.
GEvalif(S) Axiom: For an if command
and a primitive assertion P,
A proof outline for an if is then constructed by combining a proof outline for its guard evaluation action with a proof outline for each alternative.
if rule:
_B,.,_{P,-,}PO(Sn){Q} fi
{Q}
The guard evaluation action for do selects a command Si for which corresponding guard Bi holds. If no guard is true, then the control point following the do becomes active.
GEvaldo(S)
Axiom:
The inference rule for do is based on a loop invariant, an assertion I that holds before and after every iteration of a loop and, therefore, is guaranteed to hold when do terminates--no matter how many iterations occur.
do rule:
_B,_---.{P,_}PO(S,_){I} od
The inferencerule for a cobegln combines proof outlines for its component processes. Interference Freedom
For all atomic actions a in Si :
For all assertions A in PO(Sj) :
The following inference rule characterizes when a valid proof outline for a cobegin will result from combining valid proof outlines for its component processes:
Since execution of an atomic action a in one process never interferes with a control predicate cp in another, certain interference-freedom triples follow axiomatically.
Process
Independence Axiom: For a control predicate cp in one process and an atomic action a in another, {ep = X} a {cV= X} (16) Notice that NI(a, cp) follows directly from this axiom when a and cp are from different processes. 
From
=, (after(S) a (. = Ixl)) (after(S) (x --lxl)) =, (after(S) a = t 1)) Parametere describes the fixed execution time of the action on a bare machine; _ models execution delays attributable to multiprogramming and other resource contention. A system where each process is assigned its own processor is modeled by choosing 0 for _; a system where processors are shared is modeled by choosing a value for 6 based on the length of time that a runnable process might have to wait for a processor to become available.
As an illustration, suppose we know that assignment commands take one time-unit, and that there is a single processor.
If three assignment commands are started concurrently, they will be executed in some order. The first one to run will be started immediately and take one time-unit; the last one will be started two units after it was issued, and it also takes one time-unit. We also define a new real-valued term 7" to be equal to the current time.
Only certain assignments of values to these terms axe sensible in a program state. In particular, if two control points become active as part of the same event, then they must be assigned the same time.
For example, since S is the first subcommand of S T, we require that Tat(S) = Tat(S T).
Similarly, the subcommands $1 and S_ in S: cobegin $1//$2 coend start at the same time, so we require Tat(S1) = Tat(S2) = Tat(S). Notice what effect adding these terms to the state has on the definition of proof outline validity. For a an unconditional atomic action, P and Q {P} a {Q} {P} {_) [6,,] {Q} (21) Some additional axioms and inference rule allow us to reason about formulas of our more expressive assertion language. First, the various non-atomic commands of our programming language give rise to axioms based on the way they equate their components' control points. These axioms are similar to the control-predicate axioms. For our programming language, these axioms are given in Figure 6 . Next, there are the additional axioms given in Figure 7 for the assertion language. In these, cp can denote any control predicate, including those not associated wi'.h entry or exit control points for real-time actions; S is the label for a real-time action (a)[&d. Axioms (22) and (23) follow directly from the definition of Tcp. Axioms (24) and (25) capture the essence of a real-time action--that its entry control point cannot stay active too long. This, in _urn, allows us to infer that a control point is not active by using the following corollary of (24):
Recall that a proof outline PO(S) is valid
For S the sequential compositionS1S2 Tat(S) =.
Tat ( The way these new terms change value when atomic actions execute is captured by new axioms.
For any ordinary or real-time atomic action a and control predicate cp, we have:
The antecedent in the postcondition is necessary for the case where cp could become true when a finishes, e.g., cp = after(a). Next, for any ordinary action, we have: Action Time Axioms:
Action Time Axiom (28) asserts that the exit control point for S becomes active after the entry control point for S last became active. Action-time Axiom (29) makes the subtly different assertion tcp <_ 7-
(Tcp=-o¢) =_ ",ep 
at(S) _ Tat(S)_<7"<Tot(S)+_+• (24)
Tat(S) # -_ _ Tafier(S)<TatCS)+,5+e
This axiom is analogous to Action-time Axiom (28), except that now the postcondition has been strengthened to give a tighter lower-bound on when the exit control point for S first becomes active.
Two things that the Real-time Action Axiom (30) does not say are worthy of note. First, this axiom does not bound the interval during which the entry control point for S is active; Axiom (24) serves that role. Second, one might expect the following triple to be valid--its precondition being similar to that of (29).
Unfortunately, (31)is not sound. Execution of S started in a state such that Tat(a) < K < 7" would satisfy the precondition but might terminate before K + e. For example, consider an execution of (a) [o,2] that is started at time 0. Thus, at time 7" = 1 the state satisfies K < 7" if we choose K = 1, and so precondition K < 7" is satisfied by that state. When execution of (a) [o,2] terminates--2 units after it is started--at time 7" = 2, the postcondition K + _ < 7-is 1 + 2 < 2, which is false. 
Furthermore, note that (7" = 4) =} (7" _> 4)
is valid. However, if we apply the Rule of Consequence to (34) and (35), we obtain the following proof outline:
It is invalid because an idle by the environment invalidates its precondition, T = 4. In particular, let 7 be a state in which at(S) A 7" = 4 is true. Therefore, the precondition of (36) is satisfied by
7, and so is Ipo(s).
An idle can lead to a state 7' in which at(S)^7-= 4.01, invalidating Ipo(s)-Thus the proof outline does not satisfy Real-Time
Invariance (20), and hence is not valid.
We eliminate problems of this sort by modifying Rule of Consequence (2) so that idles cannot invalidate a strengthened precondition P_. In light of (36), an obvious approach is to rule out any strengthening of preconditions achieved by placing an upper bound on T. However, that restriction would prevent us from deriving the valid triple
We therefore characterize the interval over which a strengthened precondition P' must not be invalidated by an idle. For any program S, define MaxIdle(:;) (ma_mum idle time for S) to be the longest real time interval that can elapse after at(S) becomes true but before some program action of S must be executed.
If S may idle arbitrarily tong, then MaxIdle(S) = c¢. Figure 8 gives a way to calculate MaxIdle(S) by induction on the structure of S. as that program will necessarily take a step at or before time 2. In order for Rule of Consequence (2) to be sound, not only must P'=c,P hold but P' must remain true until time Tat(5,)+MaxIdle(5"). We say that an assertion P is patient for 5, if
Thus, if P' is patient for 5,, then P' can be a precondition for 5, and no idle by 5' can invalidate P'. For example, 4 < T < 6 is patient for <skip)[0a 1, but 4 < T < 5 is not. A corollary of the way _ is constructed is that the precondition of any valid proof outline P0 (5,) is patient for 5'. Note that under some circumstances P' is easily demonstrated to be patient for 5':
• If P' does not mention 7".
• If P' only gives lower bounds on 7". 
Rule of Consequence with 8, 11, and 12; patience is vacuous
NIrt(a, pre(fl))
Noticethat information about the time after a is accumulated in steps 4 and 5, and used in step 6 to reach the same conclusion that operational reasoning gave: that, once a finishes,/_ has also finished. 
this protocol implements mutual exclusion of the marked critical sections, as we now show. Mutual exclusion of at(f) and at(f') is a safety property. It can be proved by constructing a valid proof outline in which pre(f) _ -,at(f') and pre(f') =_ -at(f). g standard approach for this is to construct a valid proof outline in which -(pre(f) A pre(f')) is valid. It is thus impossible for
at(f)
A at(f') to hold, because that would imply pre(f) A pre(f'). A proof outline for the first process is given in Figure 10 ; the proof outline for the other process is symmetric, with "1" everywhere replaced by "2" and the primed labels interchanged with unprimed ones. Notice that pre(f)=_x = 1 and pre(fl)=_x = 2. Thus, the proof outlines satisfy the conditions just outlined for ensuring that states satisfying at(f) A at(f) cannot occur. It is not difficult to derive the proof outline of Figure  10 using the axiomatization of realtime actions given above. The proofs of {pre(c)} c {post(c)) and
are the most enlightening, as they expose the role of assumptions (43) and (44) I. Real-time Action Axiom (30)
3. Conjunction rule (5) on steps 1 and 2
5.
Rule of Consequence (39) on 3 and 4, noting that the precondition does not mention time and is thus patient.
RigidVariableRule (4)on 6, replacing C by true
9. Tcp-Instantiation (32) using 8 and 5 to substitute Tat(d) for K.
10. Rule of Equivalence (3) on 9
11. Derived Tcp-lnstantiation (33), and Rigid Variable Rule (4), to substitute Tat(c') + M for L in 10
12. Process Independence Axiom (16), Rigid Variable Rule (4), and Rule of Equivalence (3)
13. Disjunction rule (6) on steps 11 and 12
Rule of Equivalence (3) on 13
Axiom (22)
17. Simple Rule of Consequence (42) on steps 14 and 16
Conjunction Rule (5) on steps 18 and 17
Notice how timing information is used in step 16 to infer that a particular control point cannot be active.
Related Work
It is instructive to compare our logic with that of [17] , another Hoare-style logic [7] for reasoning about execution of real-time programs.
In eThe idea of augmenting actions with assignment commands in order to reason about the passage of time is also discussed in [5] , where it is used to extend Dijkstra's wp [3] for reasoning about elapsed execution time. A more recent effort to augment a wp calculus for real time is reported in [16] .
7The cobegin Rule of Proof Outline Logic (15) is not compositional because its interference-freedom test depends on the internal structure of the processes being composed. We thus chose to define the operational semantics of processes directly, using SOS. In this style, the behavior of a composite program is defined in terms of the behavior of its subterms. Since the state 7 must contain enough information to interpret all assertions in Proof Outline Logic, it must include:
• at(1) and after(1) for each label I
• values of program variables
• values of rigid variables
• Tat(l) and Tafter(1) for each label 1
All save the first can be encoded directly as components of a tuple. Of course, the English antecedents are made formal. Idle actions axe described by:
If 3".7" >_ 3".7" 3'.S is not required to act before 3".T 7' is otherwise the same as 7 Then 7 '-* 3'_ One important consequence of using a structural operational semantics is that 3' _ 3" iff there is a proof of 3' '-* 7' from the operational rules. These proofs can be regarded as formal objects, and, in particular, we can do induction on the proof that 3' '--+ 3". Many of the basic lemmas used for soundness proceed by such inductions. This discussion omits subtleties that are essential to the proof. For the model construction, the actual proof rules assign responsibility for the transition, so that when we define 7_ we can ensure that S takes all the transitions in 7_. Roughly, a subterm S' of the program 3'.S is responsible for the transition 7 "-+ 3" if S' appears as 70.S in the proof of 3' '-_ 7' or if the transition is idle. = Ui act(SO = act(S1) = act(S ) Then 3, _ at(1) if I is the label of an atomic action in act(3'.S).
In the actual proof, we allow at(l) when l is the label of any program, not just the label of an atomic action. This complicates the definition of act somewhat and requires use of an extra set of markers in the operational semantics.
However, it allows us to verify the Proof Outline Logic control predicate axioms without having built them directly into the definition of 3' _ at(1).
A.4 Sanity Checking
We demonstrate that the operational semantics and notion of interpreting processes are reasonable by proving a series of sanity lemmas. These are lemmas that are not necessarily used in the soundness proof proper but show that the formal definitions derived from the operational semantics agree with the less formal ones used in the body of this paper. The following sanity lemma, for example, shows that the intuitive definition of Tat(l) as the last time that at(1) became true agrees with the formal definition of Tat(l) as it appears in the operational semantics:
Let 3'o be a suitable initial state, and 7o _ 71 '--* "" ". Then, for any index i and label l, 7i.Tat(l) is:
• -c_ if (V0 < j < i : 3'./_ at(l))
• 3'./.7" if j is the largest 0 < j < i such that (3'./-1 _ at(l) and 7./_ at(1)).
• 3'o.T, if neither of the preceding conditions obtains; that is, if 3'0 _ at(1) but (/3j : 7./I¢: at(l)^7./+_ _ at(l)).
That is, the time that the bookkeeping mechanism gives for Tat(l) is in fact the value of the clock on the most recent instant that at(l) became true.
A.5 Soundness
Once the SOS rules have been constructed and their sanity checked, it is a routine matter to show soundness of all the Real-Time Proof Outline Logic axioms and proof rules. We define the model 7-/s 7 in the following way. We consider executions starting with S in an arbitrary state of control and memory.
We allow other processes in this initial state as well. We thus consider executions that start with some program that includes S; we run this program for a time (which gives an arbitrary state, perhaps with S partially executed). However, in the sequences in 7-/s 7, only S is allowed to take steps, so S must be responsible for each transition.
• 7 is an initial state for S iff 7.S includes S as a subprogram, and 7.Tat(l) and 7. Tafter(1) are initialized properly. That is, 7.Tcp = 7.7" if 7.,5" _ ep, and to -co otherwise, for cp a control predicate.
• _ is the set of all sequences (70,71,...) such that 7 '--'* 7o for some initial state 7, and 71 _ 7/+1 for every i, and S is responsible for each transition.
Note that 7_ is suffix-closed; that is, if (7o, 71,...,  7, 71+1 Similarly, we say that program fragment S' is a descendant of S if (roughly) there are states 7 '--'* 7 _ such that 7.S = S and 7'.S = S'; it is a proper descendant if S _ S'. We characterize the descendants of all terms. For example, let S be a command sequence l : ((m : St)(n : $2)), and S' be a descendant of S. Then there is at most one subterm of S' labelled l, and it must be:
• I: ((rn: S'l)(n : S2)) where SI is a descendant of $1, or Axioms and rules involving proof outlines require verifying statements of the form 7_s _ _ I_ hi.
From temporal logic, we know that, if I _ C)I is valid, so is 1:0 rnI. I is a predicate logic formula rather than a temporal one, hence it is true or false in a single state. It thus suffices to show that, for each 7 "-'* 70 _ 71 where 7 is an initial state for S, if 70 _ I, then 71 _ I. We use this method to verify each proof outline axiom and proof rule. All these verifications proceed by induction on the proof of the transition 7o _ 71-For example, to check skip Axiom (7), let S = l : skip. Ipo(s) = (at(l) =* P)^(after(l) _ P), where P is primitive. Suppose 7o _ Ieo(s). It is easy to show that 7 _ P is independent of 7.S and 7.7" if P is primitive. The proof comprises the following cases:
1. The transition is idle, and 7o _ at(l). As 7o _ Ipo(s), we conclude 7o _ P. In this case, the only component of 71 that is different from 7o is 71.T. Since the value of a primitive formula does not depend on 7.7", and since 7o _ P, we conclude 71 _ P. This suffices to
show 71 _ Ieo(s).
2.
The transition isidle,and 7o _ after(1). The proof proceeds as above.
